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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Sometime during September of 1978, Jerry Downs and Jerald 
Greaves approached Mark McCracken with a proposal to purchase the 
real property which is the subject of this action. (TR 15, 71, 
72) Mr. Downs at trial testified that he knew at the time that 
the subject property was owned by Mark McCracken, his mother, his 
uncle and aunt. (TR 71, 91, also TR 14-18) Basic terms for the 
purchase of the property were discussed and generally agreed 
upon. (TR 23, 24, 71, 72) At the suggestion of Mr. Downs, a 
contract was prepared by Attorney Scott Barrett, who was 
identified by all parties as an independent attorney to represent 
all of the parties in preparing the document. (TR 20, 71, 72) 
Mr. Barrett prepared a draft purchase agreement as well as draft 
powers of attorney, which were subsequently picked up by Mr. 
Downs and delivered to Mr. McCracken and his family for 
signature. (TR 19, 73, 74, 108, 112) On or about October 5, 
1978, Kendrick McCracken and Lila McCracken executed that certain 
Special Power of Attorney identified as Trial Exhibit 2, naming 
Mark McCracken as attorney in fact for them. (TR 17-19, 21-22, 73 
Exhibit 2) On or about the 16th of October, 1978, Doris 
McCracken executed a similar power of attorney identified as 
Trial Exhibit 3. (TR 17-19, 21-22 Exhibit 3) Thereafter on the 
19th day of October, 1978, Appellant, Jerry Downs and Jerald 
Greaves, and Respondent, Mark McCracken, individually and on 
behalf of Kendrick McCracken, Lila McCracken and Doris McCracken, 
executed that certain purchase agreement which has been 
identified as Trial Exhibit 1 and which is the subject of this 
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action for the sale and purchase of the Smithfield property. (TR 
24-25, 74-77, 88, 122 Exhibit 1) 
Mr, Downs requested Mr. McCracken to obtain the powers of 
attorney from Mr. McCracken1s mother, uncle and aunt to 
facilitate closing the transaction. (TR 72 and 73) After the 
Purchase Agreement, (Exhibit 1) had been signed, Mr. Downs 
delivered it to Western States Title Company with instructions to 
have the matter recorded, which occurred on the same day. (TR 75, 
76, Exhibit 1) The contract with the accompanying legal 
description was recorded in book number 239 page 778 entry number 
417846 of the official records of the Cache County Recorder, 
identifying the contractual interest which Appellants claimed in 
the subject property pursuant to the Purchase Agreement. (TR 110, 
Exhibit 1) Appellants purchased the Respondent's property for the 
total sum of $180,000.00 with $500.00 paid down at the time that 
the contract was executed, and the remaining balance of 
$179,500.00 to be paid over time. (TR 21, 22, 23, 26, 42,43, 76, 
7 9, 99, Exhibit 1). The contract at paragraph 1 b provides as 
follows: 
"Buyers agree to pay an additional One Hundred and Seventy-
nine Thousand and Five Hundred dollars ($179,500.00) in the form 
of a Note secured by a deed of trust on the described property. 
Said Note shall be payable in full on the first of September, 
1983. Provided, however, that, whenever buyers sell a lot or 
portion of the described property, they shall pay one-half of the 
gross sale price less real estate commission, if any, of said lot 
to Sellers to apply on said note." (Exhibit 1) 
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All parties acknowledge that no promissory note or deed of 
trust securing the same was ever executed or recorded. (TR 43, 
84, 110, 120) No payment in the form of a note or otherwise was 
made against the remaining balance of $179,500.00, except that 
during the month of August and September of 1980, five 
subdivision lots were sold and one-half of the proceeds was 
delivered to the Sellers and applied against the outstanding 
contractual balance. (TR 119, 120) Once the contract was 
executed, the Sellers had no further obligation whatsoever. (TR 
77, 86, 87). Sellers had fully performed except to provide a deed 
to the property upon payment of the outstanding balance or 
execution of the note and trust deed. (TR 33, 47) Mr. McCracken 
was ready willing and able to execute such a deed upon the 
execution and'delivery of the note and trust deed specified in 
the purchase Agreement. (TR 32, 33, 47) 
The record of title to the subject property reveals that in 
July of 1978 Kendrick and Lila McCracken quit claimed to 
themselves as trustees in trust of the Kendrick McCracken Family 
Revocable Trust, their undivided one-half interest in the 
property. (TR 6) Kendrick and Lila McCracken appointed Mark 
McCracken their true and lawful attorney-in-fact, (TR 2). Mr. 
McCracken said he had no authority to enter into a joint venture 
only the written contract for sale and related documents. (TR 34) 
The parties understood and intended that the Power of Attorney 
authorized Mark McCracken to act in the sale transaction for 
Kendrick and Lila individually and also in their trustee 
capacity. (TR 37-39, 52, 71-72, 75-77, 89, 91) Three of the 
warranty deeds conveying the subdivision lots in August and 
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September of 1980 were executed by Mark McCracken as an attorney-
in-fact for, among others, Kendrick and Lila McCracken as 
trustees. (Exhibit 8) Appellant Downs caused these warranty 
deeds to be prepared by Western States Title Company and to be 
subsequently recorded. (TR 92-94) And on or about April 23, 
1984, Kendrick McCracken and Lila McCracken individually and as 
trustees of the Kendrick McCracken Family Revocable Trust deeded 
to Mark McCracken all of their interest in the subject property 
which deed was recorded on the 27th of April, 1984, in the 
official records of the Cache County Recorders office. (Exhibt 7) 
Mr. Downs and Mr. Greaves had engaged in the development of 
the property into a residential subdivision and had gained 
approval of a final plat of subdivision, which was approved by 
the city of Smithfield, the first phase of said approved 
subdivision plat recorded as a result of the efforts of himself 
and Mr. Greaves, and at their request, in the official records of 
the Cache County Recorders office on the 21st day of August 1980. 
(TR 91-93) Said subdivision had been officially approved on or 
about the 28th day of November 1978 (Exhibit 4) Mr. Downs 
further acknowledged that he and Mr. Downs and Greaves executed 
the owners dedication of the subdivision plat and requested Mr. 
McCracken to execute the same individually and as attorney-in 
fact for the other Sellers. (TR 91-93). 
After execution of the purchase agreement on the subject 
property Mr. Downs and Mr. Greaves had full possession and use of 
the property from and after the date of the purchase agreement 
except for the permissive conditional use granted Mr. McCracken 
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of farming the unused property until development was completed in 
return for Mr. McCracken paying the annual irrigation water 
assessments. (TR 32, 33, 56, 63, 64, 65, 68, 69, 85, 91, 94, 99, 
102) The actual benefit over the years of such conditional use 
was nominal. (TR 63-65). 
After September of 1980, no significant development or 
effort of any kind was made to complete the subdivision project 
or sell the property. (TR 118) Mr. Downs had made some effort to 
sell one additional lot but was unsuccessful and acknowledged 
that he and Mr. Greaves had essentially done nothing with the 
project since that date because of the depressed real estate 
economy. (TR 119) No other moneys had been paid under the 
contract to the McCrackens except as recited above. (TR 120) 
On January 15, 1981, Mr. Greaves, Mr. Downs, and Mr. 
McCracken went to the office of Attorney Barrett. (TR 61, 106 
Exhibit 11) There was some concern about the purchase agreement 
because although it had been signed and recorded, The Buyers had 
not delivered a note and trust deed to the Sellers, and Sellers 
had not signed a deed or a trust deed and note to the Sellers. 
(Exhibit 11) All parties mutually agreed before Mr. Barrett 
"that since the purchase agreement had been recorded and since 
they were not in disagreement as to the amount that had been paid 
to date (approximately $30,000.00 to McCracken) leaving a balance 
of $149,500.00 due under the agreement, that they would just 
leave things as they are." (Exhibit 11). 
Mr. Mark McCracken made numerous inquiries of Appellants 
during the subsequent three years from 1980 to September 1 of 
1983 to determine the Appellants1 intentions of honoring the 
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contract. (TR 26-30, 66, 67) On at least one such occasion Mr. 
Downs indicated that he had until September 1, 1983 to make any 
payments, and that Mr. McCracken would simply have to wait and 
see what took place. (TR 66) The remaining balance of 
$149,500.00 was not paid on September 1, 1983 and has not since 
been paid by the Appellants. (TR 120) As a consequence, 
Respondent's brought this action for recovery of the balance due 
and for a judgment requiring the Appellants to execute a standard 
note and trust deed as contemplated under the terms of the 
agreement for the recovery of the principal sum of $149,500.00 
and further for an order authorizing the resale of the subject 
real property and application of the proceeds from that sale 
towards the outstanding judgment and a deficiency judgment 
against Appellants should the sale of the property fail to 
produce sufficient proceeds to satisfy Respondents1 claim. (TR 30) 
The value of the remaining properly was at trial 
approximately Seven Thousand Dollars ($7,000.00) per acre for a 
total of $55,000.00 to $60,000.00. (TR 65) 
Mr. McCracken said he had no authority to enter into a joint 
venture only the written contract for sale and related documents. 
(TR 34). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Respondents have fully performed to the extent reasonably 
possible, under the contract, and specific performance is an 
appropriate remedy. 
2. Appellants have improperly attempted to use evidence not 
presented at trial in support of their appeal. 
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3. Valid authority existed on the part of sellers to convey 
the property under the agreement. 
4. The transaction and relationship between the parties was 
one of a purchase and sale contract not a joint venture. 
STATEMENT OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
RESPONDENTS HAVE FULLY PERFORMED TO THE EXTENT 
REASONABLY POSSIBLE UNDER THE CONTRACT, AND 
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE IS AN APPROPRIATE REMEDY. 
It is undisputed that the trial court sitting without a jury 
has jurisdiction to entertain equitable remedies. Allen v. 
Barnes 12 P 912 (Utah). The facts clearly establish that the 
parties intended to enter into a purchase and sale contract. 
The Sellers intended to sell the subject property and the Buyers 
intended to purchase the same. 
Appellants totally ignore the fact that a precondition to 
Sellers' performance under the contract was Buyers' delivering 
their note and trust deed to the Sellers. There was certainly no 
point in Sellers deeding the property to Buyers if that would 
result in Sellers prejudicing or losing their security interest 
in the property. Certainly the Buyers had no reasonable 
expectation of receiving a deed or title insurance to the 
property absent delivery of the promissory note and trust deed. 
Significantly, Buyers sustained no prejudice and if anything 
obtained an advantage by their failure to deliver the note and 
trust deed. It is further significant that Buyers were the 
principals who initiated the transaction, and took the lead in 
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causing the documents to be prepared and established the 
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relationship with the title company in this matter. (TR 71-76) 
Appellant Downs testified that he knew who the owners of the 
property were and knew the status of title. (TR 71, 91) Indeed 
no evidence was ever presented at trial to suggest that the 
property was anything but free and clear since the date the 
contract was initially executed. Mr. McCracken testified that he 
was the owner of the property and the property was clear of 
liens. (TR 14-18, 49) It is also significant that the parties 
met in January of 1981 and acknowledged that the note, trust deed 
and warranty deed and title insurance had not been exchanged and 
all parties agreed that they would proceed under the existing 
circumstances and that the contract balance then owing of 
$149,000.00 would be paid in accordance of the contract i.e. 
September 1, 1983. (TR 61, 106, Exhibit 11) 
Under the circumstances the trial court had the option of 
either awarding monetary damages i.e. $149,500.00 plus interest 
from the due date of September 1, 1983, or alternatively ordering 
an equitable remedy that would afford both parties the benefit of 
their bargain and the protections contemplated under the contract 
i.e. execution of the note and trust deed and forclosure of the 
same. The Court in its discretion elected the latter remedy. 
Relief may be granted under circumstances where the party 
requesting such relief has exercised reasonable efforts to 
discharge his own obligation. See Bradford v. Alvey 8c Sons Utah 
621 P2d 1240 (1980), see also Huck v^ Hanes Utah 560 P2d 1142. 
The evidence is clear that Respondents, even after the 
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meeting in 1981 with Attorney Barrett contacted Appellants on 
several occasions inquiring of the Buyers' ability to perform 
under the contract and make payment. On each occasion Sellers 
were assured that the contract would be honored, and on one 
occasion, Mr. McCracken was informed by Mr. Downs that the 
contract did not require payment until September 1, 1983, and he 
would have to wait until then. (TR 26-30, 66, 67) Respondents 
acted responsibly and promptly under all of the circumstances. 
Respondents caused no delay in the enforcement of the agreement 
and caused no disadvantage to Appellants. Indeed the cause of 
action for which the trial court ultimately granted relief did 
not arise until September 1, 1983, and could not under the terms 
of the contract. (Exhibit 1) 
POINT II 
APPELLANT HAS IMPROPERLY ATTEMPTED TO USE EVIDENCE 
NOT PRESENTED AT TRIAL IN SUPPORT OF THEIR APPEAL. 
Appellants in their appeal brief suggest that the Court 
erred in judgment, and alledge that title to the subject property 
was at some time after the execution of the purchase and sale 
contract encumbered by acts of Respondent. In support of such 
allegation, Appellants rely upon exhibits indentified as 13 and 
14. No such evidence, however, was ever introduced at trial and 
exhibits 13 and 14 have never been received in any of these 
proceedings, even after trial by the Court. Appellants entire 
argument suggesting wrong doing or adversely affecting the title 
to property by Respondents, is without any merit and can not be 
raised now having not been raised at trial. 
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"Matters not presented to the trial court may not 
be raised for the first time on appeal." 
"The burden is on the parties to make certain that 
the record they compile will adequately preserve their 
arguments for review in the event of an appeal." 
Franklin Financial v. New Empire Development Company 
659 P2d. 1040 (Utah 19517, see also Duckett v^ Qlsen 699 
P2d. 734 (Utah 1985). 
POINT III 
VALID AUTHORITY EXISTED ON THE PART OF SELLERS TO 
CONVEY THE PROPERTY UNDER THE AGREEMENT 
Respondents agree with Appellants' statement that, generally 
speaking, a trustees1 powers and duties can not be delegated to 
others. This does not mean, however, that ministerial duties, 
such as executing documents for the sale of trust property, can 
not be delegated to agents or attorneys. As stated in Meek v 
Behrens, 252 P. 91 (Wash), "It is undoubtedly the rule that, 
while a Trustee may delegate to someone else a purely ministerial 
duty, he may not delegate to another his discretionary powers. 
The case of Dodge v. Stickney, 62 N.H. 330 (1882), is quoted 
in 50 A.L.R., 214, 216 as follows: 
"It is, however, permissible for a Trustee to 
employ an agent to perform ministerial duties 
connected with the execution of a trust. If a 
Trustee can not in the exercise of due caution, 
employ agents, and rely on their judgment and 
honesty in the transaction of business matters 
pertaining to the Trust, without being held 
responsible for a successful issue in every 
instance, many estates would remain unsettled for 
want of sufficiently courageous Trustees. ... If 
it is reasonably necessary for a Trustee to employ 
agents or attorneys, and if he uses ordinary care 
in their selection and proper supervision over 
the business entrusted to them, he can not be held 
liable for his discretion resulting without fault 
on his part." 
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In the instant action, Kendrick and Lila McCracken as 
Trustees of the Kendrick and Lila McCracken Revocable Trust, 
properly delegated their ministerial duty to Mark McCracken to 
execute documents necessary for the sale of the property. 
Kendrick and Lila did not delegate any discretionary or 
supervisory powers to Mark McCracken over the Trust. Instead, 
they made a decision to sell a portion of the trust property and 
granted Mark McCracken power of attorney to complete the 
transaction after their decision. 
In addition, assuming arguendo that Kendrick and Lila did 
not act as Trustees to sell trust property, any defect in the 
sale was cured by the subsequent special warranty deed (Exhibit 
7) executed by Kendrick and Lila as individuals and as trustees 
to Mark McCracken. As provided in Section 5 7-1-10, Utah Code 
Annotated and recited below, such subsequent conveyance to Mark 
McCracken has the effect of transfering any interest he obtained 
thereby to ultimately Greaves and Downs as Purchasers of the 
property under the recorded contract. 
Section 57-1-6 Utah Code regarding the necessity of 
recording notices of contract and interests in property, (which 
incidentally Appellants took advantage of) provides: 
"Neither the fact that an instrument, recorded as 
herein provided, recites only a nominal consideration, 
nor the fact that the Grantee in such instrument is 
designated as Trustee, or that the conveyance otherwise 
proports to be in trust without naming the 
beneficiaries or stating the terms of the trust, shall 
operate to charge any third person with notice of the 
interest of any person or persons not named in such 
instrument or of the Grantor or Grantors; but the 
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Grantee may convey the fee or such lesser interest as 
was conveyed to him by such instrument free and clear 
of all claims not disclosed by the instrument or by an 
instrument as recorded as herein provided setting forth 
the names of the beneficiaries, specifying the interest 
claimed and describing the property charged with such 
interest." 
Mr. Downs and Mr. McCracken both testified that it was Mr. 
Downs who suggested that a Power of Attorney be obtained to 
facilitate an expeditious closing of the transaction. (TR 19, 
20, 71-74, 108, 112) Mr. Downs indicated that he knew that Lila 
and Kendrick McCracken owned and held interest in the subject 
property prior to entering into the contract, and he had 
solicited and obtained the services of the title company to 
assist him in completing the transaction and had reviewed this 
information with Attorney Barrett. (TR 71-76) 
"The demands of this section [57-1-6] are answered if a party 
dealing with the land has information of a fact or 
facts that would put a prudent man upon inquiry and 
would, if pursued lead to actual knowledge of the state 
of the title." See Toland v^ Corey Utah 24 P. 190. 
Appellants are now estopped from asserting as an affirmative 
defense lack of authority to proceed when they in fact failed to 
exercise a prudent inquiry and had constructive notice of the 
circumstances of title and elected to proceed with the 
transaction. 
Section 57-1-10 of the Utah Code provides as follows: 
"If any person shall hereafter convey any real estate 
by conveyance proporting to convey the same in fee 
simple absolute, and shall not at the time of such 
conveyance have the legal estate in such real estate, 
but shall afterwards acquire the same, the legal estate 
subsequently acquired shall immediately pass to the 
Grantee, his heirs, successors or assigns, and such 
conveyance shall be as valid as if such legal estate 
had been in the Grantor at the time of the conveyance." 
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The potential conflict of title created by Kendrick and Lila 
McCracken' s Quit Claim Deed in trust of July 1978 is cured by the 
subsequent special warranty deed (Exhibit 7) executed by Kendrick 
and Lila McCracken as individuals and trustees to Mark McCracken. 
The subsequent deed (Exhibit 7) itself evidences the original 
intent of the McCrackens which was to sell the property under the 
purchase agreement (Exhibit 1) and as a matter of equity, 
Respondents would have been estopped from selling the property 
contrary to the purchase agreement and the rights of the 
Appellants. 
POINT IV 
THE TRANSACTION AND RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE 
PARTIES WAS ONE OF A PURCHASE AND SALE CONTRACT 
NOT A JOINT VENTURE. 
The Purchase Agreement identified as Exhibit 1 speaks for 
itself. The parties acknowledged that this is the only agreement 
which they entered into, and although it was not fully performed 
represents the contract they intended. (TR 71-76, 88, Exhibit 
11) 
"A construction giving an instrument a legal effect to 
accomplish its purpose will be adopted when it can 
reasonably be done, and between two possible constructions 
that will be adopted which establishes a valid contract. 
Schofield v. Z.C.M.I. 39 P2d 342 also Driggs v. Utah 
State 142 P2d 657. 
The only reasonable interpretation of the document is that 
it is, as it is entitled: a purchase agreement and not an 
agreement of joint venture. The document clearly indentities the 
Respondents as "Sellers" and the Appellants as "Purchasers", and 
"Buyers". The document specifically provides that the "Buyers 
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are desirous of purchasing said property for development and 
subdivision and Sellers are agreeable to sell the same." 
Paragraph 1 of the agreement provides that the "Sellers agree to 
purchase all of the property and that the Buyers agree to pay for 
the property in installments." Paragraph 2 of the agreement 
provides that it was expressly understood and agreed that the 
Buyers shall be the developers and subdividers and the Sellers 
shall have no part in nor control over the subdivision or sale of 
the lots. The only possible suggestion of a joint venture is the 
provisions of paragraph lc of the agreement, which states as 
follows: 
"Provided, further, that Buyers and Sellers agree that 
the Buyers are preparing a preliminary Plat for 
subdivision which will subdivide the property into 
Twenty-seven (27) lots and that the buyers will sell 
said lots at the best possible price. If, after all 
the lots have been sold, more than a gross sales price 
of Three hundred Sixty Thousand Dollars ($360,000.00), 
less any real estate commissions, have been realized by 
the Buyers, then Sellers shall receive as additional 
compensation for the purchase and sale of their 
property, one-half (1/2) of all of the proceeds from 
the sale of said lots exceeding Three Hundred Sixty 
Thousand Dollars ($360,000.00)." 
Even these provisions, however, identify the parties as 
"Buyers" and "Sellers" and specify that any additional funds from 
the sale of property in excess of Three Hundred and Sixty 
Thousand Dollars ($360,000.00) payable to the Sellers was to be 
identified "as additional compensation for the purchase and sale 
of their property." 
Mark McCracken testified at trial that subparagraph "c" was 
included in the contract as consideration for the fact that no 
interest was charged for the five year term of payment of the 
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agreed contract price, and further that such an allowance was 
given as an accommodation to the purchasers to encourage a 
successful development and sale of the property and further in 
anticipation of property value increase and thereby obtaining a 
higher compensation for the purchase and sale of the property. 
(TR 23) 
The evidence is clear that both parties relied upon the 
contract and therefore are entitled to enforcement of the same. 
Appellants caused the contract to be acknowledged by a notary 
public in proper form and recorded and thereby asserted their 
claim in and to the subject property and have established a lien 
and recorded claim of interest against and to the property to the 
present time. Section 5 7-1-6 of the Utah Code provides: 
"every instrument in writing setting forth an agreement 
to convey any real estate or whereby any real estate can 
be affected, to operate as notice to third person shall 
be proved or acknowledged and certified in the manner 
prescribed by this title and recorded in the office of 
the county in which the real estate is situated, but 
shall be valid and binding between the parties thereto 
without such proofs acknowledgment, certification of 
record, and as to all other persons who have had actual 
notice." 
That the parties continued to treat the transaction as a 
purchase and sale of the property is further evidenced by 
Attorney Barrett's testimony and his memo to his Greaves and 
Downs file (Exhibit 11). As stated in paragraph 2 of Attorney 
Barrett1 s memo, the parties had "mutually agreed" that they were 
not in disagreement as to the provisions of the agreement or 
their actions thereunder and that they could proceed under the 
Purchase Agreement. The parties also were in agreement as to the 
remaining balance due under the agreement being $149,500.00. 
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(emphasis added) It must be concluded there would be no "balance 
due under the agreement" if the agreement were treated as 
anything other than a purchase and sale of the property. There 
would be no balance due under a joint venture. 
Attorney Barrett1s memo also indicates that the parties 
preferred to "leave the situation as it is and not to have any 
deeds exchange hands yetl (emphasis added) It is quite apparent 
that the parties intended to transfer deeds as contemplated in 
the Purchase Agreement but that the transfer could take place at 
a later date. This further indicates that the parties continued 
to treat the transaction as a purchase and sale of the property 
even more than two years after signing the agreement. 
At no time did any of the parties contemplate their 
transaction to be a joint venture agreement or anything other 
than a purchase agreement. (TR 88) Mr. McCracken testified that 
he had no authority to enter into a joint venture, only a sale 
contract (TR 34) The following considerations evidence that no 
joint venture was contemplated: 
(a) The agreement was not for the purpose of 
making joint profit. The payments received by McCrackens 
from the sale of property were, as stated in the 
Purchase Agreement, payments on the purchase price and 
were made in a manner consistent with the contract. 
Once Respondents had received the purchase price of the 
property, Appellants would receive all remaining proceeds 
from the sale of remaining lots. 
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(b) There was no combination of property, money, 
affects, skill, labor nor knowledge. Respondents merely 
sold the property to Appellants. The Appellants were 
to subdivide the property, obtain subdivision plats and 
make any improvements to the property and to obtain 
Purchasers for the property. Additionally, it was 
Appellants who held themselves out as developers and 
approached Respondents for the purpose of purchasing 
their property. They did not request Respondents to join 
them in any common venture. 
(c) Although both parties had an interest in 
seeing that the subdivision was successful and in 
selling lots from the subdivision, the interest of 
Appellants and Respondents was very different and 
conflicting. Respondents hoped that the lots would be 
sold in order to receive the purchase price of the 
property, but other than that, Respondents anticipated 
receiving the purchase price for the property whether 
or not the Appellants sold the lots. Respondents did 
not join with Appellants in actually subdividing the property 
and did not in any way participate in obtaining 
purchasers for the lots. As such, there was no 
community of interest or common purpose. 
(d) There was also no joint propriety interest in 
the subject matter, i.e. property. Mark McCracken 
signed the deeds to Progressive Homes and signed the 
subdivision plat only as a convenience and not in exercising 
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any joint venture control over the property. Respondents obtaine< 
permission from Appellants to farm the property but had no 
right in directing the improvements, divisions, or sales of 
the property. 
(e) Respondents had no right to control or share 
in the profits nor was there any obligation to share in 
losses. As stated above, once Respondents received 
the purchase price of the property it was Appellants 
who would receive all profits from the sale of lots. 
Appellants were still obligated to pay the purchase 
price of the property whether or not lots were ever 
sold. 
Ironically if Mr. Mccracken had no authority as suggested in 
Appellant1s brief, then he had no authority to enter into a joint 
venture either. Clearly the only authority given Mark McCracken 
was to enter into the sale contract, and to execute documents 
necessary to accomplish its purposes. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants have received the entire benefit of the contract. 
Respondents have been prejudiced and damaged. Appellants are 
attempting to reneg soley because the present economic conditions 
make it difficult to sell the property purchased for profit. The 
economies of subdivision development, however, is of little 
importance to the legal and equitable issues of the case. The 
risk of subdivision development was a burden borne solely by 
Appellants. The trial court appropriately entered findings 
consistent with the evidence presented and a judgment consistent 
with law and equity. Where there is substantial evidence in the 
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record to support the trial court1s decision, that judgment 
should not be disturbed on appeal. (see Edgar v. Wagner 5 72 P2d. 
405 (Utah). The judgment should be affirmed. 
DATED this / day of May, 1986. 
JENKINS, McKEAN_& ASSOCIATES 
/ V 
Jame"s C. Jenkins 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I do hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was mailed to George Preston, Attorney at Law, 67 East 
100 North, P.O. box 3 700, Logan, Utah, 84321, by depositing the 
same with the U.S. mail postage prepaid and addressed as stated 
t h i s
 ^ ~
/f
 day of May, 1986. 
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57-1-6. Recording necessary to impart notice—Operation and effect— 
Interest of person not named in instrument.—Every conveyance of real 
estate, and every instrument of writing setting forth an agreement to 
convey any real estate or whereby any real estate may be affected, to 
operate as notice to third persons shall be proved or acknowledged and 
certified in the manner prescribed by this title and recorded in the office of 
the recorder of the county in which such real estate is situated, but shall be 
valid and binding between the parties thereto without such proofs, acknowl-
edgment, certification or record, and as to all other persons who have had 
actual notice. Neither the fact that an instrument, recorded as herein 
provided, recites only a nominal consideration, nor the fact that the grantee 
in such instrument is designated as trustee, or that the conveyance other-
wise purports to be in trust without naming the beneficiaries or stating the 
terms of the trust, shall operate to charge any third person with notice of 
the interest of any person or persons not named in such instrument or of 
the grantor or grantors; but the grantee may convey the fee or such lesser 
interest as was conveyed to him by such instrument free and clear of all 
claims not disclosed by the instrument or by an instrument recorded as 
herein provided setting forth the names of the beneficiaries, specifying the 
interest claimed and describing the property charged with such interest. 
57-1-10. After-acquired title passes.—Tf any person shall hereafter 
••.mvev any real estate by conveyance purporting to convey the same in 
f*»e simple absolute, and shall not at the time of such conveyance have the 
legal estate in such real estate, but shall afterwards acquire the same, 
the legal estate subsequently acquired shall immediately pass to the grantee, 
his heirs, successors or assigns, and such conveyance shall be as valid as if 
such W a l estate had been in the grantor at the time of the conveyance. 
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PURCHASE AGREEMENT 
THIS AGREEMENT Bade and entered into this J9^ day of 
Octohct~% 1978* by and between JERRI DOWNS and JERALD CREATES, 
hereinafter referred to as Purchasers and MARK McCRACXEN, on be-
half of himself and as attorney in fact for KEDRICt McCRACIEN and 
LILA P# McCRACKEN, husband and wife, and DORIS B. McCRACKEN, here-
inafter collectirely referred to as Sellers, is made with reference 
to the following faots: 
WHEREAS, Sellers are the owners of certain real property in the 
City of Salthfield, County of Cache, State of Utah, consisting of 
9*57 acres, more or less, a more particular description of which 
Is attached hereto and Incorporated herein as Exhibit "A*, and 
WHEREAS, Buyers are desirous of purchasing said property for 
derelopnent and subdivision and Sellers are agreeable to selling the 
same* ' 
NOW, THEREFORE, the parties hereto agree as follows: 
1» Sellers agree to sell and Buyers agree to purchase all 
of the property described in Exhibit "A" attached hereto, consisting 
of 9.57 acres more or less, in the City of Salthfield, County of 
Cache, State of Utah, and Buyers agree to pay for said described 
property the amounts, in installments as follows: 
m. As a downpayment, Buyers agree to pay to Sellers con-
temporaneous with the execution of this Agreement, the sum of 
Fire Hundred Dollars ($500«00), receipt of which is acknowledged 
by the Sellers* 
b* Buyers agree to pay an additional One Hundred Seventy-
nine Thousand, Fire Hundred Dollars ($179,500*00) in the form 
of a Note secured by a Deed of Trust on the described property. 
Said Note shall be payable in full on the First of September,. 1983• 
Provided, however, that, whenever Buyers shall sell a lot or 
portion of the described property, they shall pay one-half of 
the gross sale price less real estate commissions, if any, of 
I K« 239 r«778 
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said lot to Sellers to apply on said Mote. 
o. Provided, further9 that Buyers and Sellers agree 
that the Buyers are preparing a preliminary plat for subdi-
vision which will subdivide the property into twenty-seven (27) 
lots and that Buyers will sell said lots at the best available 
price. If, after all of the lots have been sold, more than a 
gross sales price of Three Hundred and Sixty Thousand dollars 
(1360,000.00), less any real estate commissionst has been realised 
by the Buyers, then Sellers shall receive as additional compensa-
tion for the purchase and sale of their property, one-half (1/2) 
of all of the proceeds from the sale of said lots exceeding 
$360,000.00. 
2* It is further understood and agreed that the Buyers 
shall be the developers and subdivlders and that Sellers shall have 
no part in nor control over the subdivision or sale of the said 
lots. 
3. Closing of this Agreement by Sellers deeding the 
subject property to the Buyers and Buyers delivering their Mote 
and Deed of Trust to the Sellers shall be on or before November 20, 
1978, at the sole election of the Sellers. 
k. It is agreed that this entire Agreement is contingent 
upon approval of a final plat of subdivision being approved by the 
City of Smlthfleld. .In the event said plat is not approved for any 
reason within one year from the date of this Agreement, then the 
Buyers, at their option, may reelnd the agreement by deeding the 
described property back to the Sellers in return for the Promissory 
Vote. In such event, the Sellers shall retain the Plve Hundred Dollar 
(I500.00X downpayment. 
5* It is understood and agreed that Buyers shall pay 
mil subdivision and development costs, including real estate taxes 
after the calendar year 1978. Sellers shall pay the 1978 real 
property taxes assessed against the subject property. 
6. Sellers agree to provide to Buyers a policy of title 
Insurance at Sellers9 expense within ninety (90) days after the 
239 mm 
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execution of this Agreement* 
7* As Buyers sell any lot or lots, the Seller agrees to 
execute and dellrer to the designated title company a reconreyanoe 
from the Deed of Trust on any such lots, releasing said lots from the 
lien of the Deed of Trust, 
8. This Agreement constitutes the entire agreement of 
the parties hereto and no amendments or changes may he made except 
In writing, executed by the party to be charged, 
9. This Agreement shall be binding upon the heirs, exec-
utors, successors and assigns of the parties hereto* 
DATED this /<?& day of DC^A/JA^ , 1978. 
BOXERS: SELLERS: 
Mark McCracken 
On behalf of himself and as 
Attorney in Fact for: 
ledrick McCracken and 
Lila P. McCracken, husband 
and wife, and 
Doris E« McCracken 
STATE OP UTAH ) 
County of Cache) 
BSm 
On this /ftj day of Ottob** , 1978, personally appeared 
before me JERRI DOVHS, JERALD GREAVES and MARC McCRAKEN, the 
signers of the foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledged to me 
that temp executed the same, ^ .•":*.* 
(rotary Public 
Commission expires: May/y/f/Z 
Residing in /<ya>r/ CaUid***^* 
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V. Beginning at the Vest side of street, 11.75 chains South 
of a point 14*50 chains East of the Northwest Corner of Lot 5, 
Block 2, Plat "C" Saithfleld City Survey, and running thence 
Vest, 10.0 chains; thence South, 2.0 chains; thence East 10.0 
chains, a/1, to the Vest side of said street; thence North, 
2.0 chains along the Vest side of said street, to the point of 
beginning- Containing 2.0 acres, a/1. ,.-••.. * ni-tfo~oez*** 
Beginning at a point on the Vest side of street, 13*75 
chains South of a point 14.5 chains East of the Northwest 
Corner of Lot 5, Block 2, Flat »C* Saithfleld City Survey, 
Vest 10 chains; South, 8 chains; East 10 chains; North, 6 
chains to beginnln*. Containing 7.57 acres. . _ •
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